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Abstract: Due to being much better documented, legal cartels have recently attracted 
the interest of many researchers who aim to understand the functioning of illegal 
cartels in detail. This paper contributes to the question of what we can learn from legal 
cartels by taking a closer look at the cement industry which has a rich history of both 
legal and illegal cartels. We undertake a cross-country comparison for Austria, 
Germany, Poland and Norway, providing narrative evidence for many traits of the cases 
based on a variety of detailed sources. We identify similarities between legal and 
illegal cartels in aspects such as monitoring efforts, information exchange, the 
importance of industry associations and the role of capacities, whereas we also find 
substantial differences in the allocation of clients, reactions to deviations and pricing 
schedules. 
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1. Motivation 
There is broad consensus that explicit agreements on prices, quantities and the 
allocation of customers between competing firms (so-called hardcore cartels) regularly 
reduce consumer surplus and social welfare. Most countries have adopted competition 
laws which generally prohibit this kind of agreements between competing firms. The 
enforcement of these laws is rarely easy, however, as it is hard to distinguish cartels 
from tacit collusion, i.e. non-explicit agreements on certain cooperative strategies 
which have similar consequences as explicit collusion. In some jurisdictions, cartels 
had been legal for a long time. In some countries, cartels had to register and were 
subject to regulation or at least some kind of monitoring. Even until today, agreements 
between competing firms are permitted in certain industries in some jurisdictions, or 
even promoted and enforced by the government. Export cartels are such a notable 
example. 
In order to detect illegal cartels, it is crucial to understand them. When and under what 
circumstances are they formed? How are they organized? How are they sustained? How 
are they reacting to changes in the economic environment? How are they dealing with 
competitors outside the cartel? What kinds of events can lead to their breakup? 
Answering these questions is difficult, as illegal cartels are operating secretly and even 
after their detection little information becomes publicly available. 
An interesting approach to get a better comprehension of illegal cartels is to look at 
legal cartels. Naturally, legal cartels do not have to operate secretly and this can imply 
certain differences. Nonetheless, there are a number of issues that are applying both to 
legal and illegal cartels. For instance, there is the need of finding mechanisms to 
coordinate the firm behavior, to agree on collusive parameters such as prices and 
quantities and to monitor the behavior of the participants. Additionally, legal as well as 
illegal cartels need to deal with deviations of cartel members by punishing cartel 
breakers or agree at least on compensations for deviations. Finally, potential or 
existing outsiders are a threat for any cartel. The big advantage of legal cartels is, from 
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a researcher’s point of view, that they are often very well documented. There is a 
drawback, however, because it is debatable to which extent results taken from legal 
cartels can be applied for illegal cartels as well. 
In this paper, we tackle this question by looking in detail at the cement industry. It is 
known as a cartel-prone industry and thus there is a rich history of tacit and explicit 
collusion between companies in many countries and different legal approaches of 
governments towards this cooperation. Collusion-facilitating factors such as very 
homogenous and matured products, high entry-barriers in production, repeated 
interaction, extensive multi-market contact, stable demand and transparency for 
suppliers as well as low marginal cost are widely spread in the cement sector. Collusive 
behavior is frequently observed in different macroeconomic and institutional 
environments around the world. We consider four European cases of cement cartels for 
which detailed sources are available and provide narrative evidence of the differences 
and similarities between the two legal and the two illegal cartels which we compare. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we are going to 
discuss important existing literature on legal cartels and collusion in the cement 
industry. In Section 3, we will provide a general overview on the cement industries in 
the countries which we consider in more detail. In Section 4, we are comparing the 
cartels from those countries with respect to various criteria. Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
2. Literature review 
In this section, we will first discuss existing literature on legal cartels in general and 
then take a look at papers which examine collusion in the cement sector.  
The first notable work on legal cartels is Porter’s (1983) study of the US railroad cartel 
that existed from 1880 to 1886. The cartel, which was analyzed further by Ellison 
(1994), featured patterns of deviations from collusive prices and subsequent 
punishment periods and inspired a comprehensive stream of literature dealing with 
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punishment schemes that allow the long-term sustainment of collusive outcomes, 
applying both to legal and illegal cartels.  
However, patient firms (depicted by sufficiently high discount factors) are only one 
prerequisite for successful collusion. For instance, the study of the sugar-refining cartel 
in the US from 1927 to 1936 by Genesove and Mullin (2001) shows that there are many 
other issues which determine the success or failure of a cartel. By observing and 
evaluating notes of weekly meetings of the cartel members, the authors find that some 
aspects of actual cartel behavior are not explained by the established economic theory.  
Further evidence on legal cartels is provided by Hyytinen, Steen and Toivanen (2013), 
who take data on Finnish legal manufacturing cartels from 1951 to 1990 in order to 
determine the amount of cartels and how persistent their existence is.  By the end of 
sample, nearly all industries were cartelized. The same data is also used in Hyytinen, 
Steen and Toivanen (2015), where the authors identify different types of legal cartels. 
Another empirical study is Fink et al. (2014a) who describe legal cartels in Austria. 
Perhaps the most famous work on legal cartels is Röller and Steen (2006), who 
consider the case of the Norwegian cement cartel, leading us over to the literature on 
collusion in the cement sector. Whereas we are focusing on organizational aspects of 
cartels, Röller and Steen concentrate on evaluating the effectiveness of a cartel, finding 
that the sharing rule of this particular cartel induced overinvestment in capacities. 
Previously, Steen and Sorgard (1999) had already considered the case explaining why a 
small country produced so much more cement than it consumed. 
Another case which we will also consider, the illegal German cement cartel, is 
discussed by Hüschelrath and Veith (2011) as well as Hüschelrath, Müller and Veith 
(2013). Both papers, as well as the manual for estimating a cartel’s damage using the 
example of the German cement case provided in Hüschelrath, Leheyda, Müller and 
Veith (2012) supply us with some details on the case, although these works focus on a 
particular issue rather than getting the overall picture of how a cartel operates. Most 
recently, Harrington et al. (2014) considered the case of the German cement cartel as 
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an example of a situation where a discontent cartel member can lead to the breakdown 
of the cartel.   
Finally, Bejger (2011) examined the Polish cement cartel which will also be considered 
in this study. Whereas our focus is again on the broader picture, Bejger attempts to 
answer the question whether the cartel could have been detected by looking at 
industry data, finding that market shares as well as price and supply showed patterns 
that were distinctive for collusion.  
3. The cement industry and the cases under study 
3.1. Industry characteristics 
Cement is both a binding material and an input for both mortar and concrete. It is an 
essential input for the construction sector. When talking about cement, most people 
refer to standard grey cement, also known as Portland cement. Portland cement is one 
kind of grey cement which consists almost as a whole of clinker. Although various other 
types exist, economists commonly consider cement to be an extraordinarily 
homogeneous product with very little horizontal or vertical differentiation.4 There is 
sufficient supply side substitution among different kinds of grey cement as long as 
clinker is available. 
The major part of the demand for cement originates from the construction industry. 
Cement is mainly used for the production of concrete. Concrete is a low cost input in 
the construction industry and substitution possibilities are limited. Thus the demand 
for concrete and the derived demand for cement is largely price inelastic.5 As demand 
originates from construction activity, it is highly seasonal, as little construction work is 
done in the winter. As construction activity mainly follows general economic activity 
and interest rates, in the medium run cement demand is also cyclical.  
4  The other types of cement have a lower share of clinker. 
 
5  Individual firm demand of course depends on price relative to other firms’ prices. 
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The quality of cement deteriorates over time. Cement attracts moisture and forms to 
lumps. Thus the storability of cement is limited to a few months. Customers need the 
right amount of cement, the right quality at the right place in order to keep the 
construction work running and in order to fulfil the project plan. The need for 
sophisticated logistics and timely delivery is a central feature for cement distribution. 
The production process of cement is matured and standardized all over the world and 
consists of basically two steps: Clinker production and grinding. Sintering limestone 
and clay gives clinker, an important intermediary product. This production step is the 
most costly one, as it requires both capital-intensive furnaces and cost intensive fuels.6 
Thus, capacity constraints are binding in the short run and it is reasonable to assume 
that there are also fixed and variable costs of adjusting capacity.7 In the second step, 
the clinker is then grinded with calcium sulfate and other minor constituents.  
Characteristics of the production technology imply several barriers to entry. Economies 
of scale are available for both labor and capital inputs.8 Building a new cement plant 
requires substantial investment.9 For instance, in a sector inquiry by the UK 
competition authority (Office of Fair Trading 2012), it was assessed that barriers to 
entry are high in the cement market. First, a new cement plant requires a permission 
according to the government’s planning system. Second, substantial initial investment 
of probably more than £100 million is necessary. The Office of Fair Trading also took as 
evidence that there is a lack of entry observed and only large international firms are 
active in the market. Hüschelrath et al. (2012) provide a detailed assessment of the 
barriers to entry in the German cement market. The need of access to limestone 
resources, the high initial investment, the requirements to obtain government 
permission and to fulfill environmental and noise restrictions and the high amount of 
6  According to Siemens (2009), saving 20% of the energy costs of a cement production plant 
would be enough to serve 150,000 German households. 
7  See Ryan (2011) 
8  See Norman (1979), p. 334. McBride (1981) and Rosenbaum (1994) also confirm size advantages 
in the cement industry.  
9  According to Hüschelrath et al. (2012), p. 137, the necessary initial investment can comprise the 
amount of three or four annual turnovers. 
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vertical integration exacerbate entry. However, switching costs are considered to be 
low due to the high product homogeneity and standardization laws.10 
Shipping costs for cement exhibit large economies of scale. According to d’Aspremont 
et al. (2000), a lorry can transport only 25 tons of cement up to 200 km, rail transport is 
most efficient for around 1300 tons and a ship requires 10000 tons. Thus the more tons 
of cement are bought, the larger is the area within which suppliers compete for a 
specific buyer. For smaller buyers, the relatively high transportation costs for truck-load 
amounts imply the possibility of spatial price discrimination.11 Transport by ship is 
significantly cheaper. Therefore regions close to the sea or with a long coast line are 
more prone to international trade.12 
Despite the rather local interaction of suppliers and demand, several companies are 
represented in many different countries, having established a wide network of cement 
plants. These include Cemex, HeidelbergCement (or short “Heidelberg”), Holcim and 
Lafarge which are now all operating in many countries including all those we study in 
more detail later.  
As it is difficult to store cement13, prices are more or less determined by the need to 
actually sell the produced output. The question whether differentiation is important 
depends on the environmental legislation and the geographic structure. As discussed 
before, cement is considered to be a rather homogeneous good. This view is also 
supported by the fact that product differentiation is of minor importance from the 
demand side; from the supply side, products can be more differentiated the more 
environmental rules incentivize firms to lower the share of clinker per unit of cement. 
10  Hüschelrath et al. (2012), p. 155ff 
11  In the US and in many other countries, cement producers used basing-point pricing from 1902 to 
1948 until the Supreme Court determined in FTC vs. Cement Institute that this was anticompetitive. See 
Miller and Osborne (2014). 
12  As Miller and Osborne (2014) show, average prices at the western coast of the US are much 
lower compared to within the U.S. Southwest as imports from East Asian countries are possible.  
13  See Ryan (2012). - Loose cement can be stored one month, whereas packaged cement can be 
stored three months until it attracts water and starts to become lumpy.  
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Additionally, for markets with a lower plant density and/or asymmetric geographic 
supply and demand centers, cement is spatially differentiated. 
3.2. Cases and sources 
In this study, we are taking a closer look at the cement markets of Austria, Germany, 
Norway and Poland. We have chosen these countries on the basis of available 
information, but also in order to include two different situations, namely detected 
illegal cartels in Germany and Poland and legal cartels in Austria and Norway.  
Austria had a legal, registered cement cartel from 1951 to 1995. We take the cartel 
agreement from 1980 since it is available and it was made during a period when cartels 
were registered and prices were regulated.  
For Germany, we are considering the cartel case of four regional cartels, named after 
the four cardinal directions, which existed simultaneously between around 1991 and 
2002. The cartel was discovered by the Bundeskartellamt, Germany’s competition 
authority, which lanced an investigation in May 2002 after complaints from cement 
buyers. Our main source for the German case is the elaborate court decision of the 
Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf from 2009, when it confirmed the conviction but 
reduced the penalties set by the Bundeskartellamt.  
In the case of Poland, we are considering the period from 1998 to 2009, for which the 
Polish Office for Competition and Consumer Protection (OCCP) charged seven firms for 
forming a cartel. The main source here is the decision of the OCCP. 
Finally, we are taking a look at a country with a legal cement cartel of long-term 
duration. The Norwegian cement industry was cartelized from 1923 to 1968, with the 
cartel being followed by a period of monopoly after the cartelist’s merger in 1968. Our 
main source for this is the paper by Röller and Steen (2006). 
7 
 
4. Cross-country narrative analysis 
Starting from the criteria used by Toivanen and Hytinen (2012), we compiled a list of 
aspects according to which we compare the cement market situations in the four 
countries which we take into detailed consideration. We adapted the criteria on the 
basis of available information and in order to reflect the fact that we do not study only 
legal cartels but also three countries where cartels were illegal at the time. 
4.1. Legal situation 
The legal status of cartels naturally has an important influence on its behavior. A legal 
cartel contract may either be enforced in court or include specific fines or 
compensations to prevent deviations. Illegal cartels have to come up with a different 
solution for the challenge. Nowadays, cement cartels are illegal in all countries which 
we consider for this study. However, all four nations experienced a different path 
before arriving in the rather similar legal situation of today. 
In Poland, the socialist system implied that cooperation between producers was 
fostered. This changed with the transformation to the free market economy after 1991. 
Several multinational companies entered the Polish cement market and modern 
competition law was implemented, making cartels illegal. 
In Germany, like many other European countries, cartels were legal before and during 
the Second World War. In the post-war period, a similar competition law as in the 
United States was imposed by the Western Allies. The German Competition law listed 
some exceptions where cooperation between firms was allowed, however hardcore 
cartels were illegal since the 1950s. This of course did not impede the creation of a 
series of anticompetitive agreements in the cement industry.14 
A legal cement cartel was formed in Norway in 1923 and it kept operating until 1968, 
when the cartelists merged to monopoly. From 1932, firms could even be forced to form 
14  See Puritz (1990), p. 133-180. 
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cartels. A formal ban of hardcore cartels was established in 1960, but enforcement only 
started around 1980.15 
In Austria, the cartel law from 1951 obliged cartels to register. Price increases had to be 
submitted to a regulatory body consisting of social partners that represented workers 
and firms. Registered cartels were common until Austria's accession to the European 
Union in 1995. 
4.2. Type of agreement 
In general, cement producers have a set possible action variables upon which they can 
coordinate. Coordination on the quantity to produce is of major importance as excess 
production can only be exported due to the bad storability of cement and the price-
inelastic demand. The quantity can be fixed by assigning quotas or market shares. 
Other dimensions of coordination can obviously be the price (including pricing 
schemes, which will be explained in a later section), but also more complicated 
matters like capacity investment or product design. 
In Austria, the cement cartel agreed on quotas for each member, prices were centrally 
fixed based on an average cost basis of the whole cartel. Minimizing freight costs was 
another reason to form a cartel.  
In Norway, the cartelists agreed that every firm receives a market share according to its 
capacity. Prices were set by a common sales office. Capacity planning was not part of 
the agreement. As the market share was based on the capacity, firms had incentives to 
excessively extend their capacity. Therefore, collaboration was further increased over 
time, for instance with regard to packaging, which was standardized in 1957. 
Consequently, a 1962 agreement had the goal of optimizing the whole industry’s 
production and distribution system.16 
15  See Sorgard (2007) 
16  See Röller and Steen (2006), p.327 
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The Polish cartelists agreed on fixing prices and keeping market shares according to 
historical shares. In order to prevent deviations, fixing of other sale conditions was 
implemented over the course of the cartel duration as well.17 
In Germany, four different regional cartels existed between 1991 and 2002. In all of 
them, the companies agreed on quantities and market shares. Joint pricing was not 
directly part of the agreement. In the Northern region, there were also agreements 
concerning which firm was allowed to deliver into which districts. In the Eastern region, 
the allocation of clients was coordinated. There were also some meetings in which 
supraregional issues were discussed.18 
Consistent with the expectation all cartels under study aimed at fixing the produced 
quantity. For both legal cartels it can also be observed that pricing was also centrally 
coordinated, whereas this is ambiguous for the two illegal cartels. 
4.3. Allocation of clients 
Whereas it may be obvious how to fix quantities, it might not be easy to achieve that 
every firm gets the agreed share of the pie. With imports absent, it may be possible that 
if the forecast of the demanded quantity is rather good, on average every firm can sell 
what it produces. This comes potentially, however, at the cost of inefficient delivery. 
Therefore a mechanism for the allocation of clients seems reasonable for every cartel. 
“Keeping anything as it is” might be an easy option. Whether freezing the past 
allocation of clients is the most efficient mechanism for the cartel cannot be 
investigated further in this paper. However, it seems reasonable that under competition 
clients are also somehow assigned by proximity, as nearer plants have a cost 
advantage in delivery. Thus keeping the historic allocation could also be explained by 
competition and efficient distribution.  
17  Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (2009) 
18  OLG Düsseldorf (2009), p. 46 
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In Poland, the cartelists did not formally distribute all customers between themselves. 
However, there was a non-aggression pact, an agreement not to entice each other’s 
“historical” customers. When asked for an offer by a long-time customer of another 
cartelist, a higher cement price had to be told. If a switch happened nevertheless, the 
“deprived” long-term supplier often used bilateral talks to discuss a solution. This 
could be taking over another customer or making a better offer to the customer.19 The 
distribution of production was not efficient, as tax-privileged company Ekocem’s 
production was limited to two thirds of its capacity.20 
In Austria, the agreement did not explicitly allocate individual clients. However the 
agreement included quotas and the aim to minimize freight costs. In order to keep 
relative market shares constant and in order to minimize freight costs, it would be 
rational for cartel firms to allocate individual customers based on their location as a 
starting basis to fulfil the agreement. However, the agreement has no explicit territorial 
allocation of customers.   
Whereas there was no full allocation of clients to producers in Germany, at least the 
northern cartel had the goal of fixing the existing customer bases. As a rule of reason 
the cartels agreed that there should be talks between the competitors whenever they 
get approached by a new client. The cartelists sometimes used the method of handing 
over customers to a competitor as balancing mechanism. 21   
Our sources are not providing detailed information about customer allocation in 
Norway. However, it is indicated that each firm in the cartel had its own stock of 
customers, as it is mentioned that one of the companies once delivered a substantial 
amount to the clients of another company and then compensated the fellow cartelist.22 
There are no indications that the cartels tried to agree on which clients to supply 
directly and individually. Instead, there existed some sort of grandfathering of each 
19  See (276) ff. in Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (2009) 
20  See (153) ff. in Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (2009) 
21  OLG Düsseldorf (2009), p. 29, 33, 46 
22  Steen and Sorgard (1999), p. 1781 
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members’ customers: clients supplied by other cartel members were not supplied, 
requests of such clients were not met by a competitive offer. It seems that a number of 
ways of organizing the industry rely on a low churn of customers: In Poland, there was a 
non-aggression pact. In Austria, quotas and least-freight cost based allocation may 
have prevented customers from switching their suppliers.  
4.4. Industry associations 
Industry associations can potentially support cartels by facilitating their coordination 
efforts. This may happen for instance in terms of collecting and distributing information 
or, in the case of illegal cartels, by offering a legal occasion to meet.  
In Poland, all cartelists were organized in the Polish cement association (SPC). As 
described in the section on monitoring efforts below, it helped sustaining the cartel by 
collecting and distributing data and information on cement. 
In the legal cartel of Norway, all producers were forced members of the common sales 
office, which coordinated the activities of the companies.23 Through it, it was decided 
which amount of cement was to be exported and how much was sold domestically. The 
common sales office did also determine domestic quotas according to the capacity of 
the firms. 
In Germany, cement companies are organized in two industry associations. Whereas 
there is no evidence that one of the associations, which is mainly responsible for 
negotiating wages with labor unions, was misused for collusion purposes, the Higher 
Regional Court of Düsseldorf states that the federation of German cement producers, 
(“BDZ”), played some role in stabilizing the cartel, particular in ensuring market 
transparency by collecting and distributing data. Moreover, BDZ events provided an 
opportunity for meetings of the cartelists.24  
23  Information on the Norwegian common sales office is based on Röller/Steen (2006) 
24  OLG Düsseldorf (2009), p. 19 
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In Austria, all cartel members were also members of the association of cement 
producers (“Verein der österreichischen Zementfabrikanten”) that was initally formed 
in 1894. The association had no formal role in the cement agreement but there was a  
one-to-one relationship between the members of the cartel and the association –they 
were the same. 
Looking at the evidence from the cases, it seems that industry associations were often 
involved to at least some degree in both illegal and legal cartel agreements. 
4.5. Monitoring efforts 
In order to sustain a cartel, firms need to prevent each other from cheating on their 
agreement. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct some monitoring which would detect 
deviations. This would suggest that a high level of monitoring should be observed for 
both legal and illegal cartels. 
The Polish cement cartelists exchanged a lot of secret information since the founding of 
the Polish Cement Association (SPC) in 1990, i.e. even before the proven start of the 
cartel.25 The SPC collected information on the monthly production of clinker and 
cement, domestic sales and export, energy expenditure, investment costs, the number 
of jobs and many other issues. This information was shared monthly or yearly with all 
members. After the discovery of the German cement cartel in 2002, the legal status of 
collecting this information was reevaluated. Subsequently, the task of collecting 
information was given to a law firm. Whereas aggregated data was published on the 
internet, individual firm data was distributed by the law firm to the SPC. Moreover, the 
firms bilaterally exchanged a lot of information. In 2006, the company Cemex Polska 
Sp. z o.o. admitted to the other cartelists that it had substantially underreported its 
quantities for five years. 26 
25  See (116) ff. in Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (2009) 
26  See (130) ff. in Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (2009) 
13 
 
                                                     
For Germany, the cement market during the cartelized period was rather transparent. 
The cartelists put substantial effort in monitoring each other, especially with respect to 
monitoring goods stations when imports from the east were expected. 27 After the 
German reunification, the market situation was particularly volatile. Thus every plant 
provided a list of customers and sold quantities which were distributed and used to 
monitor quotas. These lists were deemed unnecessary in 1995, i.e. several years before 
the discovery of the cartel and subsequently abandoned. 
In Austria, all sales and internal consumption of grey cement had to be notified. The 
point of measurement was the gate of the manufacturer. Notifications were done on a 
weekly basis and differentiated with respect to individual plants, different kinds, 
destination foreign country or destination region within Austria. The chairman collected 
that information and reported aggregated sales figures and quota fulfillment of each 
member back to the members. Cartel internal auditing was done by two external and 
independent auditors. Upon request, cartel members had the duty to provide all 
information on production, sales and billing to these auditors.  
Monitoring in the Norwegian cartel took place within a joint sales company. There, 
detailed statistics of sales-relevant processes were compiled.  
All in all, there was a substantial monitoring effort in both the legal in the illegal cartels 
we consider. 
4.6. Reactions to deviations 
One of the most interesting issues to observe concerning cartels is how they deal with 
actual deviations, as options range widely and include for instance price wars, 
termination of the cartel or renegotiations with the goal of continuing the cartel. Below, 
we distinguish between minor, possibly unintentional, deviations and somewhat 
larger, intended deviations. 
27  OLG Düsseldorf (2009), p. 19 
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In Germany, there was a specific practice in the southern part of the cartel. There were 
no regular meetings between the three big producers Heidelberg, Schwenk and 
Dyckerhoff. If the actual market shares differed from the agreement, it was up to the 
disadvantaged company to start negotiating a settlement of the issue.28 This differed 
from the western regional cartel, where deviations of middle-sized companies 
seemingly had no serious consequences.29 However, there were also instances of non-
negotiated reactions. For instance, the company Holcim, which detected excessive 
deliveries into the territory to the east of the Weser river, reacted by increasing its 
deliveries into the region to the west of the Weser river.30 
In Poland, it happened that some firms announced to their fellow cartelists that they 
would raise prices but then they did not implement these increases. As a reaction, 
competitors showed evidence that too low prices were used and demanded to follow 
the increase, arguing that a price war would be a disadvantage for the whole industry.31 
In general, it was attempted to solve the issue in bilateral negotiation. Remedies 
included buying cement from the disadvantaged company and handing over some 
customers, in rare cases also by lowering prices. More important was the rule that 
companies exceeding the agreed-upon quota had to start in the next price-raising 
round which increased price.32 This staggered price-increase might effectively have 
transferred customers from members excessing the quota that started to raise prices to 
members below the quota.  
In Norway, side payments played an important role. They were established in order to 
adjust for sales that violated the proposed market share of a company.33 
In Austria, sales of cement across cartel members were the recommended measure to 
compensate for deviations from the quota. For larger deviations from the quota, orders 
28  OLG Düsseldorf (2009), p. 38 
29  OLG Düsseldorf (2009), p. 37 
30  OLG Düsseldorf (2009), p. 31 
31  Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (2009), p. 73 
32  Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (2009), p. 74ff 
33  Röller and Steen (2006), p.327 
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with low freight cost were transferred within the cartel. At the end of the year, 
deviations above 5% were compensated by a cash payment.  
All in all, there was a wide variety of reactions to deviations. Legal cartels tend to make 
use of the fact that side payments are easily possible. The transfer of customers, 
possibly by the means a sophisticated price increase scheme as in Poland, was an 
option for illegal cartels. 
4.7. Capacity 
As noted earlier, capacity plays an important role in the cement industry. In the short 
run, production possibilities are constrained by the capacity of the plant and adjusting 
capacity is at least very costly if not unfeasible. Costs per unit are minimized by 
producing at full capacity whereas low plant utilization is linked with substantially 
higher costs.34 In the model of Ryan (2012), capacity is considered as the one aspect  
by which firms differ, which shows how important capacity constraints are in the 
industry.35 
In Norway, government permission was necessary for any investment in capacity until 
about 1950. With the end of shortages due to the aftermath of World War II, this 
regulation ended and huge investments in capacity followed, as capacity largely 
influenced each firm’s profit due to the configuration of the sharing rule.36   
In Austria, the agreement of 1980 provides no explicit observed rules on capacity 
increases. However, a participation or investment in an outside firm had to be 
approved by the plenary meeting with 75% majority.  Entry into the industry was 
observed in Austria in 1962, 1964 and 1980. The new entrants immediately became 
members of the cartel. In the case of the last entry in 1980, the new entrant received 
quotas from each member.  
34  See Hüschelrath et al. (2012), p. 138 
35  See Ryan (2011), p. 3. It should be noted that firms of course differ in other aspects in reality as 
well, particularly their transportation costs, as these depend on the location of a plant and the respective 
unloading points. 
36  See Röller and Steen (2006), p.325 
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In Poland, cement production was clearly below the capacity.37 The German decision 
also notes difficulties to reach satisfactory plant utilization, particularly in East 
Germany, where imports from Poland could occur.38  
All in all, excess capacities seem to be normal. This may be industry specific, but 
excess capacities are also reasonable for a cartel in order to make the threat of 
punishment more credible and thus prevent deviations. 
4.8. Transparency 
Usually, people have positive associations with transparency in general and market 
transparency in particular. Full transparency is also a necessary condition for the 
benchmark of perfect competition. However, in the context of collusion and cartels the 
positive effect of more transparency is not undisputed, as transparency concerning the 
activities of competitors makes it easier to detect deviations and thus to sustain 
collusion.  
In Germany, the market conditions during the time of the cartel were rather transparent. 
This conclusion was reached by the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf mainly due to 
the observation, that unexpected or missing orders of customers were immediately 
noticed.39 
The Polish decision also states that the cement market was transparent from 
producer’s point of view since cartelist exchanged secret trade information.40 
For Norway, we did not find any direct evidence. However, it seems likely that the 
common sales office collected all relevant information before optimizing the behavior 
for the whole industry and also that firms had a good knowledge about their fellow 
cartelists’ capacities and plans.  
37  Bejger (2011), p. 92 
38  OLG Düsseldorf (2009), p. 49, 52, 66 
39  OLG Düsseldorf (2009), p. 19 
40  Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (2009), p. 118ff. 
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The high level of transparency in Austria was already described in the section on 
monitoring above. For customers, the registered cartel agreement was publicly 
available. Overall, we find that transparency was always high for producers which 
enabled them to quickly notice deviations should they arise. Countervailing 
transparency for buyers was not prevalent everywhere. 
4.9. Meetings 
Physical gatherings of firm’s decision makers are an excellent way of stabilizing a 
cartel. Whereas legal cartels allow official meetings with the purpose of price or non-
price agreements, evidence of meetings has played an important role in the 
prosecution of illegal cartels.  
The Polish case is a good example of this. The authorities determined that two types of 
meetings played an important role for the cartel, namely meetings on chief executive 
level and meetings of trade department heads. Meetings of the latter took place every 
month between 1998 and 2000, with the main topics being the planning of price 
increases and the discussion of cases where firms did charge less than the agreed 
minimum prices. Meetings on chief executive level took place on request and had 
similar topics, with a tendency for more long-term planning and more important 
deviations being discussed. 41 
In Germany, meetings were subject to the risk that respective evidence could also be 
used in court against the cartelists. However, there were regional differences. For 
instance, in the southern region, there were no regular meetings, whereas in the 
eastern region, the complexity of the cartel agreement made regular meetings 
necessary. These were first held in Germany, but later often abroad in order to avoid 
detection. In this case, data on the cartel’s agreement was stored on a computer in 
41  Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (2009), p. 31ff. 
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Switzerland, with access only possible for representatives of two different 
companies.42 
For the legal cartels in Norway and Austria, the number and frequency of meetings is 
not restricted (beyond the usual cost-benefit assessments of having a further meeting).   
4.10. Entry deterrence and reactions to new entrants 
In general, high entry barriers are an important condition for the success of a cartel. 
Otherwise, entrants could easily undercut the prices of the cartelists and take many 
customers away from the cartel, reducing its profits. The cement industry comprises 
already some entry barriers which were discussed in the third section above. Potential 
entrants can also be importers. If a new firm enters the cartelized market, an interesting 
situation arises, as the entrant may constitute a serious threat for the profitable cartel 
situation.  
In Poland, the competition authority concluded that the cartel agreement raised 
barriers to entry.43 The only company which entered the market during the cartel took 
advantage of a special economic zone. In the year 2000 Ekocem Sp. z o.o. entered the 
market. This company was able to benefit from being located in a special economic 
zone, which provided a substantial cost advantage due the exemption from many taxes 
and fees. The incumbents reacted by agreeing to allow the new firm a production of 
400.000 tons.44 This was implemented by a contract, in which Gorazde Cement S.A. 
consented to buy this amount annually from Ekocem. The other companies agreed to 
pass customers with an aggregated demand proportionally to their market share45 to 
Gorazde, which then sold these customers the cement produced by Ekocem. In 2003, 
Gorazde acquired control of Ekocem.46 
42  OLG Düsseldorf (2009), p. 38 and 46. 
43  Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (2009), p. 99 
44  The total production amount in 2000 was about 15 million tons. 
45  For instance, since Lafarge had a market share of 22.6%, it passed customers with a demand of 
around 90,400 tons or 22,6% of 400.000. 
46  Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (2009), p. 41ff. 
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Entry occurred in Austria in 1962, 1964 and 1980. The last entry had easy access to raw 
materials and kept the entry secret as long as possible. In Austria, entry into the cartel 
agreement had to be approved by the existing cartel members.  
In Germany, due to the declining demand, there was no entry of other firms in the 
market. However, imports from other countries were a threat for the cartel, which will 
be discussed in greater detail below. 
4.11. Pricing schedules 
When it comes to the pricing schedules of legal and illegal cartels, answers to two 
questions appear especially important. First, how often do cartelists adjust their prices, 
and second, do they change their prices simultaneously or rather consecutively? 
In the legal cartel of Norway, price decisions were centrally taken by the common sales 
office and thus implemented simultaneously.  
In Poland, however, prices were raised consecutively by the firms according to specific 
agreements. Often, this method was used in order to balance market shares, as 
companies which sold more than they should according to the plans, were supposed to 
raise prices earlier in the next round. This proceeding was probably also less 
suspicious than simultaneous price increases would have been. However, the gap 
between the price increasing dates was rather small, usually between 1 and 10 days.47 
In Germany, the coordination of prices was not an explicit part of the agreement. Cartel 
firms agreed only that they try to hold prices constant or on a relatively high level. List 
prices were and are still today announced by so called price letters, and the actual 
price is then decided by negotiation. As the paper of Hüschelrath et. al. 2012 reveals, 
there was regularly a substantial difference between the list and the actual price paid. 
In Austria, cartel members used a common costing sheet to consider all costs, fixed as 
well as marginal cost. Price increases were approved by a quasi-regulatory body. Due to 
47  Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (2009), p. 59 
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this regulation, prices were increased for all cement producers within Austria at the 
same time. The approval of price increases was negotiated on a yearly basis.  
In this section, we find several differences, particularly the preference of legal cartels 
for simultaneous price increases, whereas illegal cartels consider non-simultaneous 
price increases. The price scheme used by the Polish cartel is rather sophisticated and 
achieves two goals at the same time, namely deception against a competition authority 
which might take a closer look at an industry where simultaneous price movements are 
observed whereas on the other hand, balancing market shares is possible. Common 
economic models do not suggest this kind of scheme.  
4.12. The role of exports and imports 
Since transport costs are high in comparison to the value of cement, the exports and 
imports are not a perfect substitute for each customer. This only changes whenever 
shipping over water is possible, as transportation cost is much lower, or when 
production cost in a country “nearby” can outweigh the difference in transportation 
cost. Also, as capacity is fixed in the medium run, trade with other countries is more 
likely to occur when demand and capacity level differ substantially, as exporting is then 
a substitute for divesting. Also, imports and exports require a certain infrastructure 
(such as specific cargo terminals) which cannot be achieved in the short term, but 
requires investment. 
The Polish decision contains data on export and import for the years from 2002 to 
2007. The market share of imports ranged between 1.48% and 5.78% and not more 
than 3.78% of the yearly production were exported.48  
The German cement cartel was regularly challenged by imports, especially from Eastern 
Europe. Especially at the Eastern border, imports from Poland and the Czech Republic 
were substantial. Some customers even tried to source cement from Thailand and 
Indonesia. Those imports triggered a higher demand for information by the cartelists 
48  Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (2009), p. 94 
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and lead them to introduce lists of customers.49 There is anecdotal evidence that cartel 
firms tried to stop importing activities by either buying up their cement or simply 
acquiring the importer themselves.50 It took until the late nineties until exports 
exceeded imports. This might partly have to do with the fact that German cement 
producers bought up importing Polish plants thereby reducing importing possibilities. 
Also the domestic demand dropped significantly due to the downturn of construction 
activity in East Germany. After the breakdown of the German Cartel it can be observed 
that Germany has become not only a net exporter, but that almost 20% of production is 
shipped outside the country, mostly to the Western neighbors. 51  
In Norway, the cement cartel exported all excess production. The destinations of the 
exports were mainly non-European countries, a fact which has been explained with fear 
of retaliation by companies from other European nations who could credibly threat to 
enter the Norwegian market. 52 
For Austria, imports from Germany were never observed on a significant scale. Imports 
rose when the iron curtain was removed in 1990. Buyer power lead to a significant 
amount of imports and the approved cartel slowly eroded.  
All in all, the role of exports and imports was not that important, which may be a 
particular result for the cement industry, because transportation costs make up a 
considerable part of the wholesale price in the cement industry. Alternatively, 
coexisting cartels across the border – as for Germany and Austria or Germany and 
Poland for certain periods and thus cartels among cartels offer a different explanation.  
4.13. Overview in tables 
This subchapter contains the findings for all categories in a summary table. Moreover, 
we provide a table with data on the discussed cartels following the style of the coding 
49  Fink (2014), p. 15, describes a similar observation for the sugar cartel in Austria-Hungary. 
50  OLG Düsseldorf (2009), p. 42-45. The costs for banning imports were then divided by the cartel 
firms at the national roundtable. 
51  Hüschelrath et al. (2012), p. 145ff 
52  Röller, Steen (2006), p.324 
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protocol by Fink et al. (2014b). Most items in Table 2 are binary and a “Yes” in each 
category is denoted by a “1”. In items regarding market shares, “0” can also mean 
close to 0, for instance for the share of imports. 
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Table 1: Discussed cement cartels and their characteristics  
  Austria Germany Norway Poland 
Considered 
time frame 1951-1995 1991-2002 1923-1968 1998-2009 
Legal situation  Legal cartel Illegal cartel 
detected 
Legal cartel Illegal cartel 
detected 
Peculiarities 
Prices 
increases had 
to be 
approved by 
regulators 
Four 
simultaneous 
regional 
cartels 
Sharing rule 
depending on 
capacities 
Sophisticated 
pricing scheme 
for balancing 
and deception 
Type of 
agreement 
Quotas, 
centrally fixed 
prices 
Quantities and 
market shares 
Market shares, 
centrally fixed 
prices 
Price fixing, 
keeping 
historical 
market shares 
Allocation of 
clients 
Optimization 
with respect to 
minimized 
freight cost 
Partly 
historical 
fixing, but not 
sustained 
Each company 
kept its stock of 
customers 
Sticking to 
historical 
distribution 
Role of 
industry 
associations 
No formal role 
Collected and 
distributed 
data, provided 
opportunity for 
meetings 
Coordination, 
organization 
Collected and 
distributed data 
and information 
Reactions to 
deviations 
Sales within 
cartel or 
transfer of 
clients 
Disadvantaged 
party should 
start 
negotiating 
Side payments 
Negotiation, 
advancement of 
next price 
increase 
Role of 
capacities 
Capacity 
investments 
had to be 
approved by 
cartel, entry 
added excess 
capacity 
Overcapacities 
existed, thus 
strong threat 
of retaliation 
Strong 
overinvestments 
as a result of 
the sharing rule 
Overcapacities 
existed when 
cartel was 
detected 
Transparency 
high at least 
for producers high 
probably high 
for producers 
high for 
producers 
Meetings Not restricted 
Different 
frequency 
depending on 
regions 
Not restricted 
Frequent, some 
regularly, some 
on request 
Pricing 
schedules 
Simultaneous 
prices 
increases 
Firms kept 
some space for 
individual 
negotiation 
Simultaneous 
implementation 
of price 
increases 
Consecutive 
implementation 
of price 
increases 
Role of 
exports and 
imports 
Not important 
until 1990 
Some 
importance of 
Eastern 
neighbors 
Many exports, 
but mainly to 
South America 
Both always 
below 6% 
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 Table 2: Data on the discussed legal and illegal European cement cartels   
 Austria Germany Norway Poland 
Legal 1 0 1 0 
number of firms 9 6 2 10 
start year 1951 1991 1923 1998 
termination year 1995 2002 1968 2009 
entry during cartel 1 0 0 1 
exit during cartel 0 0 0 0 
Merger(s) during cartel 1 1 0 1 
market share of outsiders 0 0 0 0 
market share of imports 0 0 0 0 
termination reason EU ascension Detection merger to monopoly detection 
price regulation 1 0 0 0 
market transparent for buyers 0 1 0 0 
market transparent for producers 1 1 1 1 
price fixing 1 0 1 1 
market share fixing/quotas 1 1 1 1 
fixing historical customers 0 1 1 1 
optimization with respect to 
freight costs 1 0 0 0 
strong role of industry association 0 1 1 1 
product specialization 0 0 0 0 
capacity restrictions 1 1 0 1 
meetings 1 1 1 1 
information exchange quantities 1 1 1 1 
information exchange prices 1 1 1 1 
information exchange 
exports/imports 1 1 1 1 
side-payments 0 0 1 0 
handover of customers 1 1 0 0 
earlier price increases 0 0 0 1 
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5. Conclusion 
Assuming that legal cartels enable learning about illegal cartels, we studied the 
European cement sector, an industry with a particularly rich history of cartels. We 
considered two countries with legal cartels, two countries with illegal cartels and 
compared the narrative evidence of these cases with respect to a variety of aspects.    
The legal cement cartels which we considered share several similarities with the 
described illegal cartels. All four cartels relied on quotas and some sort of price fixing. 
For all four, customers were not perfectly allocated to individual members, but the 
churn of customers was kept low. Industry association played a role in information 
exchange. For all but the Norwegian joint sales company, we observe notification of 
quantities. In the illegal cartel in Poland, data on inputs to the cement production like 
energy expenditures and employees were exchanged, too. The legal cartel in Austria 
relied on external auditors. Next, deviations were met by compensations or side 
payments in the legal cartels in Austria and Norway. For the illegal cartels, Poland 
relied on staggered price increases to transfer customers. In Germany, we observe 
sales outside the agreed-upon territory in order to sanction deviating behavior. None of 
the cartels was able to effectively restrict capacity. Meetings put illegal cartels at the 
risk of detection but where necessary to run the illegal cartels. The legal cartel in 
Austria as well as the illegal cartel in Poland integrated entrants into the cartel. Price 
setting was transparent for legal cartels. Illegal cartels faced but handled challenges to 
coordinate due to secret price cutting. We observe imports as a competitive  primarily 
in Germany. Import prevention activities included buying up imported cement or 
importers themselves.  
26 
 
References 
 
d'Aspremont, C., Encaoua, D. and Ponssard, J. (2000). Competition Policy and Game 
Theory: Reflections Based on the Cement Industry Case. In G. Norman and J. Thisse, 
Market Structure and Competition Policy: Game Theoretical Approaches (pp. 9-30), 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bejger, S. (2011). Polish cement industry cartel – preliminary examination of collusion 
existence. Business and Economic Horizons, 4(1), 88-107. 
 
Ellison, G. (1994). Theories of cartel stability and the joint executive committee. RAND 
Journal of Economics, 25, 37–57. 
 
Fink, N. (2014). The sugar cartel in Austria-Hungary before 1914. Working paper.  
http://webmeets.com/files/papers/EARIE/2014/469/fink_sugar_cartel_austria_hunga
ry_aug_2014.pdf. Accessed 31 March 2015. 
 
Fink, N., Schmidt-Dengler, P., Stahl, K. & Zulehner, C. (2014a). Registered Cartels in 
Austria – An Overview. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 14-058. 
 
Fink, N., Schmidt-Dengler, P., Stahl, K. & Zulehner, C. (2014b). Registered Cartels in 
Austria – Coding Protocol. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 14-057. 
 
Friederiszick, H. & Röller, L. (2010). Quantification of harm in damages actions for 
antitrust infringements: Insights from German cartel cases. Journal of Competition Law 
& Economics, 6(3), 595–618. 
 
Genesove, D. and Mullin, W. (2001). Rules,Communication, and Collusion: Narrative 
Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case, The American Economic Review, 91(3), 379–98. 
27 
 
 Genesove, D, Persson, L., Steen, F., Schmidt-Dengler, P., Stahl, K., Toivanen,O., 
Zulehner, C. & Hyytinen, A. (2014). Registered Cartels: An International Comparison, 
ZEW Discussion Paper No. 14-059. 
 
Harrington, J., Hüschelrath, K., Laitenberger, U. and Smuda, F. (2014). The Discontent 
Cartel Member and Cartel Collapse: The Case of the German Cement Cartel, ZEW 
Discussion Paper No. 14-084. 
 
Hüschelrath, K. and Veith, T. (2011). The Impact of Cartelization on Pricing Dynamics, 
ZEW Discussion Paper No. 11-067. 
 
Hüschelrath, K.,  Müller, K.  and Veith, T. (2013). Concrete Shoes for Competition: The 
Effect of the German Cement Cartel on Market Price, Journal of Competition Law and 
Economics 9 (1), 97-123. 
 
Hüschelrath, K., Leheyda, N., Müller, K. & Veith, T. (2012). Schadensermittlung und 
Schadensersatz bei Hardcore-Kartellen – Ökonomische Methoden und rechtlicher 
Rahmen, ZEW Wirtschaftsanalysen, Bd. 102, Baden-Baden. 
 
Hyytinen, A., Steen, F. & Toivanen, O. (2015). Cartels Uncovered. Working Paper. 
http://feb.kuleuven.be/public/N10076/Hyytinen_Steen_Toivanen_2015_01_16.pdf. 
Accessed 18 March 2015. 
 
Hyytinen, A., Steen, F. & Toivanen, O. (2013): Anatomy of cartel contracts. Working 
Paper. https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/425079/1/MSI_1313.pdf. 
Accessed 18 March 2015. 
 
28 
 
Jans, I. & Rosenbaum, D. (1996). Multimarket contact and pricing: Evidence from the 
U.S. cement industry. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15, 391-412. 
 
McBride, M. (1981). The Nature and Source of Economies of Scale in Cement Production, 
Southern Economic Journal, 48, 105–115. 
Norman, G. (1979). Economies of Scale in the Cement Industry. Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 1979, 27(4), 317-337. 
 
Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (2009). Decision DOK-7/09 of the Polish 
competition authority regarding the Polish cement cartel. 
 
Office of Fair Trading (2012). Aggregates - The OFT's reason for making a market 
investigation reference to the Competition Commission. Resource document. 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http://www.oft.gov.uk/s
hared_oft/market-studies/oft1358ref.pdf. Accessed 18 March 2015. 
 
OLG Düsseldorf (2009). Court decision Vl-2a Kart 2 -6/08 of the Higher Regional Court 
Düsseldorf regarding the German cement cartel.  
 
Röller, L. & Steen, L. (2006). On the Workings of a Cartel: Evidence from the Norwegian 
Cement Industry. The American Economic Review, 96(1), 321-338. 
Rosenbaum, D. (1994). Efficiency v. Collusion: Evidence Cast in Cement. Review of 
Industrial Organisation, 9, 379–392. 
 
Ryan, S. (2012). The costs of environmental regulation in a concentrated industry, 
Econometrica ,Volume 80, Issue 3, p. 1019–1061. 
 
 
 
29 
 
Siemens (2009). Wie wird Zementherstellung energieeffizient und umweltfreundlich? 
http://www.industry.siemens.com/datapool/industry/industrysolutions/cement/de/Z
ementherstellung-de.pdf. Accessed 18 March 2015. 
 
Sorgard, L. (2007). Cartel Investigations in Norway. Resource document. 
http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/iKnowBase/Content/425749/070222_LARS_SORG
ARD.PDF. 
 
Steen, F. & Sørgard, L. (1999). Semicollusion in the Norwegian cement market. 
European Economic Review, 43(9), 1775-1796. 
30 
 
